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 CHAPTER 12 
 
Lease Finance and Demise Charters- Lessors’ Risks and 
Liabilities 
 
Simon Baughen* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
An alternative to financing the purchase of a ship by a loan secured by a mortgage is through 
lease financing. This will generally be used for tax reasons whereby the lender can obtain the 
benefit of capital allowances on the vessel and is thereby able to reduce the cost of the loan.1 
Under UK taxation rules this was possible for finance leases entered into prior to 1 April 2006 
unless there was an option for the borrower to purchase the vessel before the end of the loan.2 
The new rules which apply to leases entered into on or after 1 April 2006 allocate capital 
allowances under long funding leases to the lessee, not the lessor, so that long funding lessors 
are taxed in a similar way to which the way in which they would have been taxed had they 
made a loan, and long funding lessees in a way that is similar to the way in which they would 
be taxed had they purchased the asset.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Shipping Law, Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law, Swansea 
University 
                                                 
1   In the US there was a boom in finance leases in the 1970s  to take advantage of  federal income tax 
incentives  and many of the first generation of Alaska crude carriers were financed in this way. “Lease 
Financing for Vessels Engaged in the Coastwise Trades.” http://www.marinemoneyoffshore.com/node/5684 
(accessed 23 August 2014). 
2  A finance lease with an option for the lessee to acquire the asset falls within s.67 of the Capital 
Allowances Act 2001 if the option to acquire the asset is below the expected market value of the asset at the date 
the option is exercised. In this case capital allowances will be claimable by the lessee and not the lessor.  This is 
because the payments under the lease contain an element that is regarded as capital. If there is no option to 
purchase the charter will still be a finance lease unless ownership passes automatically to the lessee at the end of 
the lease. It could be a finance lease if the total rentals over the initial lease period represent at least 90% of the 
value of the equipment. Chapter 11 of the Capital Allowances Act 2001 Chapter 11, ‘Overseas Leasing’ is directed 
at limiting the extent to which the benefit of 25% UK writing-down allowances on the acquisition of capital assets 
can flow through to non-UK residents. 
3  Finance leases of more than five years will constitute long funding leases, but a lease of between five 
and seven years will constitute a short lease if: (a) It is treated as a finance lease under generally acceptable 
accounting principles and (b) the residual value of the equipment is not more than 5% of its market value at the 
commencement of the lease and (c) the rentals in each year must generally not vary more than 10% from the value 
of the rentals due in the previous year 
Under a finance lease legal title to the vessel being bought will be transferred to the 
lender who will then execute a bareboat charter to the borrower for the term of the loan.4 This 
will transfer possession of the vessel for the term of the charter to the borrower, who will crew 
the vessel. The lender’s primary security will be its ownership of the vessel, although this will 
be supplemented by guarantees from various parties associated with the borrower. The bareboat 
charter will reflect the fact that this is a conditional sale. Loan repayments will be made through 
payments of hire throughout the life of the charter at the end of which the borrower will obtain 
ownership of the vessel. Alternatively, a ship may upon expiry of the financing charter be 
scrapped or disposed of at her then current scrap or market value or at a price driven by tax 
considerations. The charter may include an option to acquire ownership before the end of the 
charter term. It may also provide the lender with a right to mortgage the vessel to obtain 
additional finance, together with an assignment of the ship's earnings, insurances and 
requisition compensation as security for any loan that the owners take, subject to a direct 
undertaking from the mortgagee bank that they will allow the charterers quiet enjoyment of the 
vessel. The owners will usually be given the express right to sell or otherwise transfer their 
rights in the ship together with the charter to a third party provided that, in so doing, they do 
not increase the charterers' obligations. The charter may also provide for a set fee to be paid on 
termination reflecting the remaining hire instalments due under the charter, discounted for early 
payment, and providing that on sale of the vessel any excess over this sum is to be paid to the 
charterers as a refund or rebate of rental. 
 
This paper will examine three issues arising out of the use of bareboat charters as a 
means of financing ship purchase. First, what are the potential liabilities to which the lender 
will be exposing itself by taking ownership of the vessel during the course of the charter? How 
will these be addressed by charter provisions as to indemnity and insurance? Second, what are 
the lender’s rights in the event of default by the charterer? Thirdly, what is the lender’s position 
in the event of the borrower’s insolvency? I shall look at these issues from the perspective of 
UK law and US law and will refer to the standard bareboat form, BARECON 2001. 
 
II. OWNERS’ LIABILITIES  
 
A) In personam claims  
 
Under a bareboat charter possession of the vessel will be transferred to the charterer and it is 
the charterer who will crew the vessel. Accordingly, there will generally be no contractual 
liability under bills of lading issued during the currency of the demise charter as the charterers 
will have no actual or ostensible authority to bind the owners. In Baumwoll Manufactur Von 
Carl Scheibler v Furness5 the bill of lading was signed for the master, but the master being the 
servant of the charterers, the bill of lading constituted a contract with the demise charterers and 
not the owners. Nor were the owners bailees of the cargo. It is also extremely unlikely that the 
owners will incur any liability in negligence in respect of the operation of the vessel during the 
charter, except possibly as regards damage caused by unseaworthiness existing at the time the 
vessel was delivered and of which the owners were, or should have been aware.6 Where damage 
                                                 
4  Under a ‘synthetic lease’ additional finance may be obtained by the lender who will then execute a 
mortgage on the vessel. 
5  [1893] AC 8. 
6  Part III of Barecon deals with purchase of a new build and contains a provision in clause 1(d) which 
precludes charterers’ from raising claims in respect of the vessel's performance or specification or defects arises 
except as regards defects which manifest themselves within the first 12 months from the date of delivery of the 
vessel. In this event, the owners obligation is to endeavour to compel the builders to repair, replace or remedy any 
is caused by concurrent causes of initial unseaworthiness and negligence/unseaworthiness 
arising after delivery, the owners would still be liable if the initial unseaworthiness was a 
material cause of the damage.7 
 
 However, it is possible for the owners to incur personal liabilities in the interim period 
between termination of the charter and redelivery of the vessel. In The Chem Orchid 8 the 
charter was terminated in April 2011 and bills of lading were issued in June and July 2011 
before the physical redelivery of the vessel. The High Court of Singapore held that there was 
an arguable case that the vessel had been constructively redelivered in mid-April 2011 which 
meant that from that moment on the possession and control of the vessel passed to the owners, 
even though the crew continued to be employed by the charterers. The owners had placed the 
demise charterers in the position as their representatives in respect of bills of lading issued and 
indirectly represented to shippers that the demise charterers were authorised to bind the owners 
to the bills of lading; and the shippers had relied on this conduct.9 After the termination of the 
charter, the owners could have made it clear that the vessel no longer had their authority to take 
on cargo and issue bills of lading. 10 Although the owners had repeatedly demanded the return 
of the vessel after the termination of the charter, they took no steps to recover possession of the 
vessel as expressly provided for in article 26(5) of the Lease Agreement whereby in the event 
that the charterer delayed return of the vessel, the owner was to be allowed unilaterally to 
retrieve the vessel at the charterer’s expense.  
 
 The lender’s exposure to owner’s liabilities during the currency of the charter may be 
limited by vesting ownership in a subsidiary of the lender. Under UK law the courts will not 
pierce the corporate veil to make the parent company liable11, although there may a greater 
chance of this happening in the US. However, most personal liabilities that can be incurred by 
a shipowner will be subject to mandatory insurance provisions, which are discussed later in 
this paper.12 
                                                 
defects or to recover from the builders any expenditure incurred in carrying out such repairs, replacements or 
remedies. Lines 35 to 44 expressly limit owners' liability to charterers to the extent that the owners are able to 
make a recovery against the builders under the guarantee clause of the newbuilding contract.  Lines 39 to 44 
provide that charterers are to accept such sum as the owners are reasonably able to recover from the shipyard, and 
not to make any further claim on the owners for the difference between the amount recovered and the true cost of 
the repairs. These provisions will not affect owners’ liability to third parties who suffer loss or damage as a result 
of the vessel’s unseaworthiness at the time of delivery. 
7   In IBA v EMI and BICC (1980) 14 BLR 1 a television aerial mast collapsed due to oscillation of the 
mast during high winds.  The collapse was  caused by two forces of stress on the mast but the party who designed 
the mast was liable only in respect of one of them and the other stress was, for which they were not liable, was 
“by far the more important cause” of the collapse.  However, as the first stress “materially contributed to the 
collapse” the House of Lords held that the designer was  liable in full.  Lord Fraser, at 37 and 38, applied the 
statement of Lord Reid in McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, 4: “It has always been the law that a 
pursuer succeeds if he can show that fault of the defender caused or materially contributed to his injury.  There 
may have been two separate causes but it is enough if one of those causes arose from the fault of the defender.  The 
pursuer does not have to prove that this cause would of itself have been enough to cause him injury.” Although 
the House of Lords in  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 cast doubt 
on certain dicta in McGhee's case, it is suggested that it remains authority for the proposition just stated. 
8  [2014] SGHCR 1; [2014] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 520. 
9   A similar finding had been made in Australia in CMC (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Ship “Socofl Stream” 
[1999] FCA 1419; (1999) 95 FCR 403; (CA) [2001] FCA 961. 
10  This argument was only raised by two of the three bill of lading claimants, but could have applied equally 
to the third claimants and also to the other claimants who had supplied bunkers to the vessel in June 2011 after 
the termination of the demise charter. 
11  Adams v. Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA). 
12  The Amoco Cadiz [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 304. 
 a) Liability under International Conventions 
 
The owners of a vessel will also come under two strict liability regimes in relation to oil 
pollution and bunker spills by reason of two international conventions which the UK has 
ratified. The first is the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (‘1992 CLC’) which imposes strict liability on all shipowners13, irrespective of their 
nationality or flag, in respect of discharges or escapes of ‘persistent oil’ from laden bulk oil 
tankers and to escapes of oil from oil tankers on ballast voyages following the carriage of oil, 
unless it is proved that no residues from the carriage of any such oil remain in the ship. Liability 
is also imposed in respect of escapes from combination bulk carriers, for example, oil, bulk, 
ore carriers (OBOs). The Convention applies: 
(a) to pollution damage14 caused: 
(i) in the territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State, and 
(ii) in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting State, established in accordance 
with international law, or, if a Contracting State has not established such a zone, in an 
area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of that State determined by that State in 
accordance with international law and extending not more than 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured; 
(b) to preventive measures15, wherever taken, to prevent or minimize such damage. 
 
Liability is strict, but the shipowner may escape liability if it can prove that the 
discharge or escape or the threat of contamination: 
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or an exceptional, 
inevitable and irresistible natural phenomenon; or 
(b) was due wholly to anything done or left undone by another person, not being a 
servant or agent of the owner, with intent to do damage; or 
(c) was due wholly to the negligence or wrongful act of a government or other 
authority in exercising its function of maintaining lights or other navigational aids for 
the maintenance of which it was responsible. 16 
Article III.4 provides: “No claim for compensation for pollution damage may be made against 
the owner otherwise than in accordance with this Convention.”  
 
The shipowner is entitled to limit its liability as follows.17 
• for vessels not exceeding 5,000 gross tons, a flat rate of 4.51 million SDRs; 
• for vessels between 5,000 and 140,000 gross tons, 4.51 million SDRs plus an 
additional 631 SDRs for each additional gross ton above 5,000 gross tons; 
                                                 
13  Defined in Art 1.3 as “the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of 
registration, the person or persons owning the ship.” 
14   Defined in Art 1.6 as “ (a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the 
escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that 
compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited 
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement 
 (b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.” 
15  Defined in Art 1.7. as “any reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident has occurred to 
prevent or minimize pollution damage.” “Incident” is defined in Art 1.8 as “any occurrence, or series of 
occurrences having the same origin, which causes pollution damage or creates a grave and imminent threat of 
causing such damage.” 
16  Article 3.2. 
17  Subject to Art 4.2 which provides: “The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this 
Convention if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with 
the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.” 
• for vessels of 140,000 gross tons and above, the limit is 89.77 SDRs. 
Under Art.7 all ships carrying in bulk a cargo of more than 2,000 tons of persistent oil are 
required to supply a certificate confirming liability insurance covering their CLC liabilities. 
Each Contracting State must ensure  that  insurance or other security is in force in respect of 
any such ship wherever registered, entering or leaving a port in its territory, or arriving at or 
leaving an off-shore terminal in its territorial sea, if the ship actually carries more than 2,000 
tons of oil in bulk as cargo.  
 
The second international convention is the 2001 International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage. This came into force on 21 November 2008. This 
applies a similar liability regime to that imposed by the CLC in respect of spills of bunker oil 
outside the vessel, wherever they occur, which cause damage in the territory of State Parties. 
The Convention, however, defines ‘shipowner’ in terms wider than those used by the CLC, as 
‘the owner, including the registered owner, bareboat charterer, manager and operator of the 
ship’. There is no separate provision for limitation of liability. Instead, claims under the 
Convention will fall to be limited under either the 1957 or 1976 Limitation Conventions. 
Article 7 provides that for vessels over 1,000 gross tons, the registered owner, but not the other 
persons falling within the definition of ‘owner’, must maintain insurance equal to the amounts 
of liability under the applicable national or international limitation regime applicable in the flag 
state, but not exceeding the limits in the 1976 Convention, as may be amended. In the UK s 
168 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 provides that any liability under the Convention shall 
be deemed to be a liability to damages in respect of such damage to property as is mentioned 
in Art 2(1)(a) of the 1976 LLMC. 
 
Strict liability is also imposed on shipowners under two other international conventions, 
neither of which are yet in force: the 2010 International Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances by Sea in respect of damage caused by carriage of hazardous and noxious 
substance18; the 2007 Nairobi International Convention on the removal of wrecks which makes 
shipowners liable for the costs of locating, marking and removing wrecks located beyond the 
territorial sea but within the exclusive economic zone of a State Party. The Convention, which 
has been ratified by the UK, will come into force on 14th April 2015. 19 
 
b) Liability under Statute 
 
The demisors may also become liable under a UK statute imposing liability on the ‘owners’ of 
a vessel. In BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Chevron Shipping Co20 the House of Lords 
considered the meaning of s.74 of the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act 1847 under 
                                                 
18  A public law liability for water pollution by ships carrying hazardous substances is imposed on the 
‘operator’ of the ship by the Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35/EC, as an activity falling within Annex 
III. Directive 2013/30 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations  amends the Environmental Liability Directive 
so that the ambit of damage to surface water extends from coastal waters all water up to one nautical mile seaward 
from the baseline to all EU waters including the exclusive economic zone (about 370 km from the coast) and the 
continental shelf where the coastal member states exercise jurisdiction. The Environmental Liability Directive 
defines “operator”  as “the person who operates or controls such an activity, including the holder of a permit or 
authorisation relating to that activity, or the person registering or notifying such an activity. Where there is a 
bareboat charter the ‘operator’ would be the demise charterer who is the person who operates or controls the 
relevant activity, the carriage of dangerous cargo, and would not cover the registered owner. 
19  The convention has also been ratified by: Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, India, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Nigeria, and  Palau.   
20  [2001] UKHL 50; [2003] 1 A.C. 197. 
which strict liability was imposed upon the owner of a vessel which caused damage to any 
harbour, dock, pier or quay. It was held that for the purposes of s.74 of the 1847 Act, the 
"owner" of a vessel meant the registered owner and did not include a charterer, even a bareboat 
charterer.  
 
 Liability for breach of statutory duty may also arise under s.100 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995 which places a duty on the owner of a ship to take all reasonable steps to 
secure that the ship is operated in a safe manner and creates a criminal offence if there is a 
failure to comply. In Littlejohn v Wood & Davidson Ltd 21 the Scottish Outer House considered 
that s.31(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (since replaced by s.100 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995), created a civil liability and hence a crew member who was injured while 
carrying out repairs while the ship was docked was entitled to sue the owner of the ship. The 
section provided, “It shall be the duty of the owner of a ship to which this section applies to 
take all reasonable steps to secure that the ship is operated in a safe manner… .”  and subsection 
(4) indicated that in addition to the owner of a ship, a charterer or manager could also be 
involved in criminal conduct if involved in the operation in question. At the time the vessel 
was being operated under a contract that was probably a demise charter. It was held that for the 
purposes of s.31(1), a ship was being operated when at sea, afloat in port, under repair, or 
loading and unloading cargo.22 Although failure to comply with the section was a criminal 
offence, civil claims for damages could also be allowed as the legislation was aimed at 
protecting a particular class of persons, ie. all those on board ship, whether at sea or not.23 
Another potential source of liability in the Act is to be found in s. 49 which provides that the 
owner and master shall be guilty of an offence, and the ship subject to detention if in the UK, 
if a ship goes to sea or attempts to go to sea without carrying such officers and other seamen 
as it is required to carry under section 47.   
 
 In contrast, s.98 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 will not apply to the owner where 
the vessel is demise chartered. The section provides that the owner and master of a ship which 
is in a port in the UK or is a UK ship and is any other port will be guilty of an offence if the 
ship is dangerously unsafe. Subsection 2, however, provides: 
  
(2)Where, at the time when a ship is dangerously unsafe, any responsibilities of the owner  
with respect to the matters relevant to its safety have been assumed (whether wholly or in  
part) by any person or persons other than the owner, and have been so assumed by that person  
or (as the case may be) by each of those persons either—  
  
(a) directly, under the terms of a charter-party or management agreement made with the  
owner, or  
  
(b) indirectly, under the terms of a series of charter-parties or management agreements,  
                                                 
21  1997 S.L.T. 1353. 
22  Section 31(1) provides Lord Johnston  noted  that “where an owner had simply appointed a manager or 
had let the ship on demise charter and was not to any extent involved in its management, it would be a sufficient 
defence for him to aver that he took all reasonable steps as required by subs (1) by either effecting such a 
management arrangement or by effecting the charter. On the other hand one can envisage situations where both 
an owner and a manager could be involved in the event or matters to which the subsection related and therefore 
joint responsibility was possible.” However, the defendants did not advance this as a defence. 
23  Lord Johnston stated: “With regard to the secondary question of civil liability, I am clearly of the view 
that this legislation and particularly s.31 falls firmly within the exception clearly stated in the law for over 100 
years where particular legislation is conceived for the protection of a particular class of people. Here the class is 
enormous, namely all those at sea, including those on board a ship in port, but is nevertheless a specific and 
definable class totally akin to those who work in factories wherever they may be. I am therefore firmly of the view 
that this section admits a claim for civil liability in principle and the defenders' attack in this respect also fails.” 
  
the reference to the owner in subsection (1) above shall be construed as a reference to that  
other person or (as the case may be) to each of those other persons.  
 
 Section 42 implies an obligation into every contract between the owner of a UK ship 
and the master of or any seamen employed on the ship that the owner of the ship shall use all 
reasonable means to ensure the seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage at the time when the 
voyage commences and to keep the ship in a seaworthy condition for the voyage during the 
voyage. This must apply to the demise charterer as ‘owner’ as there will be no contract of 
employment between the registered owner and the master and any seamen. 
 
  
 
c) In rem Admiralty jurisdiction 
 
An in rem action may be brought in the Admiralty Court against the vessel in respect of 
maritime liens. If a claim is a maritime lien it will attach to the res from the date of the claim 
and will be unaffected by subsequent changes in its ownership. The maritime lien also attaches 
notwithstanding that at the time of the incident the vessel was on demise charter.24 Therefore, 
in rem proceedings may be brought against a vessel in respect of a collision notwithstanding 
that it has been sold to purchasers, without notice of the claim, before the issue of the writ. 
However, the owners of the demise chartered vessel will not be liable in personam and their 
liability will be limited to the value of the res. Further, a maritime lien will be lost if the res is 
sold by an order of the court. A maritime lien may be exercised only against the vessel against 
which the claim arose and not against any other vessel in the same ownership.  At common law 
the following claims have been established as giving rise to maritime liens. 
(a) damage caused by a ship – This will cover claims arising out of a collision but will not cover 
cargo claims unless they are brought against a vessel that has collided with the vessel on which the cargo 
was being carried; 
(b) salvage –  
(c) seamen’s wages –  
(d) master’s wages and disbursements –  
(e) bottomry and respondentia –  
 
An in rem claim may also be brought against the vessel in respect of the claims listed 
in headings s. 20(2)(e) – (r) of the Senior Courts Act 1981:25 
(e) any claim for damage done by a ship . . . 
(f) any claim for loss of life or personal injury sustained in consequence of any defect in a ship or 
in her apparel or equipment, or in consequence of the wrongful act, neglect or default of: 
(i) the owners, charterers or persons in possession or control of a ship; or 
(ii) the master or crew of a ship, or any other person for whose wrongful acts, neglects or defaults 
the owners, charterers or persons in possession or control of a ship are responsible, being an act, neglect 
or default in the navigation or management of the ship, in the loading, carriage or discharge of goods on, 
in or from the ship, or in the embarkation, carriage or disembarkation of persons on, in or from the ship; 
(g) any claim for loss of or damage to goods carried in a ship; 
(h) any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use 
or hire of a ship; 
(j) any claim in the nature of salvage: 
(i) under the Salvage Convention 1989; 
                                                 
24  The Father Thames [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 364 (QB). 
25  (2) In the case of any such claim as is mentioned in section 20(2)(a), (c) or (s) or any such question as 
is mentioned in section 20(2)(b), an action in rem may be brought in the High Court against the ship or property 
in connection with which the claim or question arises. 
(ii) under any contract for or in relation to salvage services; 
(iii) in the nature of salvage not falling within (i) or (ii) above, or any corresponding claim in 
connection with an aircraft. 
(k) any claim in the nature of towage in respect of a ship or an aircraft; 
(l) any claim in the nature of pilotage in respect of a ship or an aircraft; 
(m) any claim in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship for her operation or maintenance; 
(n) any claim in respect of the construction, repair or equipment of a ship or in respect of dock 
charges or dues; 
(o) any claim by a master or member of the crew of a ship for wages (including any sum allotted 
out of wages or adjudged by a superintendent to be due by way of wages) . . . 
(p) any claim by a master, shipper, charterer or agent in respect of disbursements made on account 
of a ship;. 
(q) any claim arising out of an act which is or is claimed to be general average; 
 (r) any claim arising out of bottomry; 
The right to proceed in rem against the vessel in respect of such claims is subject to s.21(4) of 
the Senior Courts Act 1981 which provides. 
 In the case of any such claim as is mentioned in section 20(2)(e) to (r), where— 
(a) the claim arises in connection with a ship; and 
(b) the person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam (“the relevant person”) was, 
when the cause of action arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control of, the ship, an 
action in rem may (whether or not the claim gives rise to a maritime lien on that ship) be brought in the 
High Court against— 
(i) that ship, if at the time when the action is brought the relevant person is either the beneficial owner of 
that ship as respects all the shares in it or the charterer of it under a charter by demise; or 
(ii) any other ship of which, at the time when the action is brought, the relevant person is the beneficial 
owner as respects all the shares in it. 
Therefore, if the demise charterer as ‘the relevant person’ is liable on the cause of action when 
the cause of action arose, the in rem action can be brought against the ship. If security is not 
provided for the claim the ship can then be sold. An in rem action can also be brought against 
a sister-ship of the demise charterers, but not against a sister-ship of the owners. For there to 
be an in rem action against the vessel for a statutory lien the demise charterer who is liable in 
personam must have been in possession or control of the ship when the cause of action arose.  
 
 This provision, or its equivalent, has given rise to some litigation in some common law 
jurisdictions when the demise charterer incurs a liability and subsequently the vessel is 
withdrawn from the demise charter with proceedings being commenced after the date of 
withdrawal. The issue is whether when the action is brought the relevant person is still the 
demise charterer of the vessel which depends on whether redelivery of the vessel is required 
for the relevant person to cease to be the demise charterer of the vessel. The authorities on this 
are mixed. Some cases have required redelivery for termination26: others have not.27  
 
 In The Chem Orchid28 the High Court of Singapore has recently held that redelivery is 
required, but a symbolic or constructive redelivery will suffice. The essence of a demise 
charterparty was that the owners conferred possession and control of the ship on the charterer 
                                                 
26  Australia: Patrick Stevedores No 2 Pty Ltd v MV “Turakina” May 1998, Federal Court unreported (“The 
Turakina”). New Zealand: Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd v The ship “Rangiora” [2000] 1 NZLR 49; [2000] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 36 (“The Rangiora”).  
27  Hong Kong: Gulf Marine & Industrial Supplies Inc v The Demise Charterer of the Ship or Vessel MV 
“Trident Dawn” [1992] HKCFI 273 (“The Sea Empire”).  Australia: CMC (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Ship “Socofl 
Stream” [1999] FCA 1419; (1999) 95 FCR 403 (“The Socofl Stream First Instance”) and on appeal [2001] FCA 
961 (“The Socofl Stream Appeal”); ASP Holdings Ltd v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1379;  (2006) 
235 ALR 554; Ships “Hako Endeavour”, “Hako Excel”, “Hako Esteem” and “Hako Fortress” v Programmed 
Total Marine Services Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 21; (2013) 296 ALR 265 (“The Hako Fortress”).  
28  [2014] SGHCR 1; [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 520. 
for the duration of the charter, so placing charterers in the same position as the owners. An 
effective termination of a demise charter required the withdrawal of both possession and 
control of the ship. The guiding principle was that termination and redelivery was required to 
bring the charter to an end but this was subject to the provisions of the charter itself. In The 
Rangiora 29, redelivery was held to be required as it was specifically stated in clause 10(a) of 
the charterparty that hire was to be paid until the day and hour of redelivery of the possession 
of the vessel which meant that possession of the ship continued until it was redelivered to the 
owner. However, the charterparty in The Socofl Stream30 did not contain any clause requiring 
hire to be paid till redelivery. The charterparty contained a clear contractual right to terminate 
the charterparty. The charterparties in ASP and The Hako Fortress31 were on Barecon 2001 
form where the position is even clearer with cl. 29 providing that once a notice of termination 
is issued, the charterer shall hold the vessel as gratuitous bailee pending physical repossession 
by the owner. Accordingly, once the notice of termination was issued, both control and 
possession of the ship were terminated and the charterer held the ship on bailment for the 
owner. 
 
 The Sea Empire32 was the odd man out in these cases, as the charterparty there provided 
for hire to be paid until the day and hour of delivery of possession of the vessel, as had been 
the case in The Turakina and The Rangiora, but the Hong Kong court held that redelivery was 
not required and the charterparty was terminated once the notice of termination was issued. 
The Singapore High Court declined to follow the decision noting that The Sea Empire had been 
decided before the full analysis of the law relating to demise charters by Tamberlin J in The 
Turakina. However, there would be constructive or symbolic redelivery once the charterers 
acknowledged their intention to surrender the ship, and this had happened before the issue of 
proceedings by the claimant.33 
 
d) Compulsory Insurance 
 
The Merchant Shipping (Compulsory Insurance of Shipowners for Maritime Claims) 
Regulations 2012 SI 2012/2267 34 came into force on 5th October 2012.35 The Regulations 
provide that ships may not leave or enter UK ports unless the shipowner has insurance which 
must cover at least maritime claims subject to limitation under the 1996 Protocol to the 1976 
Convention.  
 
     Where the Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated into the contract for the carriage of 
goods, and that contract imposes liability for loss resulting from delay in the carriage by sea of 
                                                 
29  [2000] 1 NZLR 49; [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 36. 
30  [1999] FCA 1419; (1999) 95 FCR 403; (on appeal) [2001] FCA 961. 
31  [2013] FCAFC 21; (2013) 296 ALR 265. 
32  [1992] HKCFI 273. 
33  In The Rangiora, a letter from the liquidators acknowledging receipt of the notice of termination and 
accepting the termination was sufficient to constitute constructive redelivery of the ship. In The Turakina (at 
[125]) Tamberlin J indicated that a “statement of intent by the charterer to the effect that possession was 
surrendered or redelivered” would be an act of symbolic delivery of possession and also (at para 126) that “some 
step or acknowledgement by the charterer to give effect to the redelivery” was required to show constructive 
redelivery.  
34  Implementing Directive 2009/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims. 
35  Except for regulation 3(3)(b) which comes into force on the date of commencement of Part 9A and 
Schedule 11ZA(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 which were inserted by the Wreck Removal Convention 
Act 2011 (c.8). 
cargo, the insurance must cover maritime claims in respect of loss resulting from delay in the 
carriage by sea of cargo. The insurance must cover maritime claims in respect of loss resulting 
from delay in the carriage by sea of passengers or their luggage, but only where the delay is 
consequent upon—(a)an incident involving a collision, stranding, explosion, fire or other cause 
affecting the physical condition of the ship so as to render it incapable of safe navigation to the 
intended destination of the passengers and their luggage; or (b) any other incident involving a 
threat to the life, health or safety of passengers.  
 
     The Regulations apply to seagoing ships of 300 gross tonnes or more but do not apply 
to warships, auxiliary warships or other State owned or operated ships used for a non 
commercial public service. 
 B) US Law 
 
a) Liability at common law 
 
The vessel owner owes an absolute duty to seamen36 and those doing seamen’s work37 to 
provide a seaworthy ship. The warranty continues when the vessel is under a demise charter, if 
the injury was caused by an unseaworthy condition present when the charter was made.38 There 
are dicta in the Fifth Circuit in Baker v Raymond39 that the owner of a demise chartered vessel 
will be liable in respect of injuries caused by an unseaworthy condition arising after delivery 
under the charter, but the general consensus of circuits is against this.40 In The Marine Sulphur 
Queen the proximate cause of loss of vessel and its crew could be inferred from several aspects 
of unseaworthiness, some occurring prior to delivery of the vessel to the demise charterer and 
some occurring after the delivery.41 This raised a difficult question of causation which the 
Second Circuit did not have to resolve due to its finding that the owner was the wholly owned 
subsidiary of the charterer, and was therefore held to be liable along with the demise charterer.42  
 
 The owners will not be liable in tort in respect of loss or damage arising out of the 
operation of the vessel during the period of the demise charter43, unless the loss or damage is 
due to unseaworthiness that was present when the charter was made. Gabarick v Lauren 
Maritime44 involved a collision involving a barge that had been demise chartered by its owner 
ACL to DRD, who had then time chartered it back to ACL. A basis for ACL’s liability would 
be in negligence for knowingly placing an unsafe vessel into the hands of unsafe vessel 
operators and that this placement caused the collision. Although the vessel was in a poor state 
at the date of the demise charter, this was not causative of the collision. This was caused by the 
fault of DRD’s employees. DRD had knowledge of its employees’ misconduct which created 
an environment conducive to repetitive safety violations by its employees, especially the 
                                                 
36  The Osceola, 189 US 158 (1903) in which the Supreme Court held that an owner of a ship is liable to 
indemnify seamen in his employ for injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel or its appurtenant 
appliances and equipment.      
37  In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 US 85, 89 (1946) the Supreme Court  held that “seamen” are 
individuals who perform work onboard vessels traditionally performed by seamen and who are not covered by 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950). 
38  Rodriguez v. Coastal Ship Corp., 210 F.Supp. 38 (SDNY 1962). 
39 Baker v. Raymond International, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1981).  The decision in the case was 
that the owner could not make a valid bareboat charter relinquishing control. 
40  However, a claim in rem may be made against the vessel itself in respect of injuries caused by 
unseaworthiness, whenever arising. In the Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464 (1901); Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 373 U.S. 
410 (1963). 
41   460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972). 
42  Per Judge Anderson at 100-101 “Where, as here, the court inferred proximate cause from several aspects 
of unseaworthiness, some occurring prior to delivery of the vessel to MTL and some occurring after the delivery, 
we might appear to be faced with an insoluble problem whether MSTC, as owner-demisor, can properly be held 
liable to the Death Claimants. However, on the peculiar facts of this case, we need not decide that interesting 
question. Where, as here, the owner-demisor is a wholly owned subsidiary of the charterer, the stock of which 
would clearly be available to satisfy the claims of the Death Claimants if MTL's other assets were insufficient, we 
see nothing which, as a practical matter, bars us from affirming liability as to MSTC. We emphasize that we do 
not decide whether in a case of unexplained disappearance where the owner-demisor is not a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the parent-demise charterer, the owner could properly be held liable when it was responsible for 
only some of a group of defects which, in *101 their totality, were inferred to be the proximate cause of the loss.” 
43   The Lotus Maru, 615 F.Supp. 78 (SDNY 1985) where it was held that the owners were under no 
personal liability in tort in respect of an alleged shortage of a cargo of gasoline. 
44  900 F.Supp.2d 669 (ED La 2012) 
captain and steersman. The owners, ACL, however, had acted reasonably in the vetting process, 
although its vetting was imperfect and needed improvement.   
 
 If the owners are liable in personam they can limit to the amount of vessel’s value 
absent privity or negligence on their part. With a corporate owner this depends on privity or 
knowledge on the part of managerial employees.45 An owner can be vicariously liable for 
negligence of non-managerial employees and still be entitled to limit.  
 
 However, the vessel may still be liable in rem up to the amount of her value if service 
can be effected on her and if the claim is a maritime lien.  Maritime lien claims in the US are 
wider than in the UK and include: ship repairs; ship supplies; towage; use of dry dock or 
maritime railway or other necessities to any ship; crew wages; tort claims arising from a 
collision; personal injury claims (excluding Jones Act claims against employer); wharfage; 
stevedoring; cargo damage/loss; certain maritime contracts (e.g. – breach of charter party); 
preferred ship mortgages; salvage; claims for maritime pollution. 
 
b) Statutory liabilities 
 
Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
of 1980 (‘CERCLA’)46 imposes liability on the owner and operator of a vessel or facility from 
which there is a release, or a threatened release, which causes the incurrence of response costs, 
of a hazardous substance. There are three defences available to the person who would otherwise 
be liable if they can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release of the 
hazardous substance  was caused solely by:  
(1) an act of God, or 
(2) an act of war, or 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one 
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, 
with the defendant. The defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised 
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics 
of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions 
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably 
result from such acts or omissions 
The limitation figure for vessels carrying hazardous substances is the greater of $5,000,000 or 
$300 per gross ton. For vessels not carrying hazardous substances as cargo or residue, the 
limitation is the greater of $500,000 or $300 per gross ton. For incineration vessels, defined as 
"any vessel which carries hazardous substances for the purpose of incineration of such 
substances, so long as such substances or residues of such substances are on board," the 
limitation is the total of all costs of response plus $50 million. The right to limit will be lost if  
(A)(i) the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance was the result of willful misconduct or 
willful negligence within the privity or knowledge of such person, or (ii) the primary cause of the release 
was a violation (within the privity or knowledge of such person) of applicable safety, construction, or 
operating standards or regulations;  
or (B) such person fails or refuses to provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by a 
responsible public official in connection with response activities under the national contingency plan 
with respect to regulated carriers subject to the provisions of title 49 or vessels subject to the provisions 
of title 33 or 46, subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph shall be deemed to refer to Federal standards or 
regulations.47 
                                                 
45  In Re Norfolk Dredging Co., 2006 WL 3182761 (E.D.Va.). 
46  42 U.S.C. §  9607. 
47  In addition “If any person who is liable for a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance fails 
without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial action upon order of the President pursuant to 
section 9604 or 9606 of this title, such person may be liable to the United States for punitive damages in an amount 
Section 108 then provides: “The owner or operator of each vessel (except a non self-propelled 
barge that does not carry hazardous substances as cargo) over three hundred gross tons that 
uses any port or place in the United States or the navigable waters or any offshore facility, shall 
establish and maintain, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the President, evidence 
of financial responsibility of $300 per gross ton (or for a vessel carrying hazardous substances 
as cargo, or $5,000,000, whichever is greater) to cover the liability prescribed under paragraph 
(1) of section 9607(a) of this title.” 
 
 A similar regime was introduced by the Oil Pollution Act 1990 which imposes liability 
on the ‘responsible party’, for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses 
the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining 
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone.48 The ‘responsible party’, which in the case of a 
vessel means the owners, operators, and demise charterers, will be liable for the removal costs 
and damages specified in OPA 90 that result from such incident, up to prescribed limits of 
liability, subject to the three defences set out in CERCLA 1980. 33 U.S.C. 2716(a) of OPA 90 
requires owners and operators, including demise charterers, of certain vessels to establish and 
maintain evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the maximum amount of 
liability to which they could be subjected under OPA. These requirements apply to responsible 
parties for any vessel over 300 gross tons (except a non-self propelled vessel that does not carry 
oil as cargo or fuel) using any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and any 
vessel using the waters of the exclusive economic zone to transship or lighter oil destined for 
a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The current limits of liability for vessels 
are. 
 (1) For an oil cargo tank vessel greater than 3,000 gross tons with a single hull, including a single-hull 
tank vessel fitted with double sides only or a double bottom only: the greater of $3,200 per gross ton or 
$23,496,000.  
(2) For a tank vessel greater than 3,000 gross tons, other than a vessel referred to in (1):the greater of 
$2,000 per gross ton or $17,088,000.  
(3) For an oil cargo tank vessel less than or equal to 3,000 gross tons with a single hull, including a single-
hull tank vessel fitted with double sides only or a double bottom only: the greater of $3,200 per gross ton 
or $6,408,000.  
(4) For a tank vessel less than or equal to 3,000 gross tons, other than a vessel referred to in (3): The 
greater of $2,000 per gross ton or $4,272,000.  
(5) For any other vessel: the greater of $1,000 per gross ton or $854,400.  
 
c) Insurance and Indemnity 
 
Barecon 2001 addresses the shipowner’s exposure to liabilities arising out of the charterer’s 
operation of the vessel in three ways; by insurance; by indemnity; and by a non-lien clause. 
 
d) Insurance 
 
Clause 10 (iii) requires charterers to “maintain financial security or responsibility in respect of 
third party liabilities as required by any government, including federal, state or municipal or 
other division or authority thereof, to enable the Vessel, without penalty or charge, lawfully to 
enter, remain at, or leave any port, place, territorial or contiguous waters of any country, state 
or municipality in performance of this Charter without any delay.” This will cover mandatory 
insurance, such as that required under CLC or under OPA. The necessary arrangements are to 
                                                 
at least equal to, and not more than three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of such 
failure to take proper action.” 
48  ‘Oil’ is widely defined and will include bunker oil. 
be made at charterers’ sole expense and charterers “shall indemnify the Owners against all 
consequences whatsoever (including loss of time) for any failure or inability to do so.” 
 
Clause 13 is the general insurance and repairs provision which requires charterers to 
keep the vessel insured against hull and machinery, war, and P&I risks, as well as any financial 
security required under cl.10(iii). The insurances are to be arranged to protect the interests of 
both Owners and Charterers and the insurance policies “shall cover the Owners and the 
Charterers according to their respective interests.” Charterers “shall effect all insured repairs 
and shall undertake settlement and reimbursement from the insurers of all costs in connection 
with such repairs as well as insured charges, expenses and liabilities to the extent of coverage 
under the insurances herein provided for.” Charterers must also make the necessary documents 
available to the owners in order for the latter to comply with the insurance provisions of the 
Financial Instrument. If the charterers fail to arrange and keep any of the insurances the owners 
are given a right to withdraw under clause 28(a) (ii) which allows the owners the option of 
giving the charterers a respite of a specified number of days to rectify the position. Barecon 
2001 contains an alternative provision in clause 14 whereby the registered owner will pay for 
hull insurance, with the charterer still being responsible for P&I cover, with a specific provision 
that the registered owner and insurers will have no rights of recovery or subrogation against 
the demise charterer, a provision that does not appear in clause 13.  
 
The effect of clause 13 on the charterer’s obligations to the owners and the right of 
owners’ insurers to proceed against charterers by way of subrogation for breach of charter was 
recently considered in The Ocean Victory which concerned a demise charter on Barecon 1989 
and the effect of the equivalent clauses, 12 and 13.49 The vessel had become a total loss and a 
claim was being pursued by owners’ hull insurers against the time charterers for breach of the 
safe port warranty. Time charterers argued that the demise charterers had no claim against them 
as the demise charterers had incurred no liability under the safe port warranty under the head 
charter because of cl. 12.  It was submitted that clause 12 of the demise charterparty contained 
a complete code for the treatment of insured losses as between the parties in the event of a total 
loss. Accordingly, it could not have been intended by the parties that the demise charterer 
would have been liable to the registered owner for breach of the safe port warranty in respect 
of losses covered by the hull insurance taken out by the demise charterer at its expense in the 
joint names of both the registered owner and demise charterer.50 The charterers pointed to the 
express waiver of subrogation in deleted clause 13 which did not appear in clause 12. 
 
Teare J held that cl. 12 was not comparable to the war risks clause in The Evia (No 2) 
and it did not codify the rights and liabilities of the parties with regard to insured risks:  
“It provides for the provision of insurance and who is to pay for it, for the demise 
charterers to be responsible for insured repairs and to reimburse themselves from the 
proceeds of the insurance policy, for the demise charterers to be responsible for other 
repairs and for the claims on a total loss to be paid to the mortgagee for distribution to 
the registered owner and demise charterers in accordance with the their respective 
interests. I do not consider that this “codifies” in the required sense the rights and 
                                                 
49  [2013] EWHC 2199 (Comm); [2014] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 59. These clauses are now clauses 13 and 14 of 
Barecon 2001. 
50  The value of the vessel was US$88.5 million and the amount paid by the insurers was US$70 million 
which would mean that  Gard's claim would have to be reduced by that amount if the time charterer’s argument 
was correct. 
liabilities of the parties with regard to breach of the safe port warranty where the 
casualty caused by the breach has given rise to a claim on the insurance.” 51 
 
Teare J then went on to consider the effect of the provision that the owners and demise 
charterers were to be co-assureds. Did this bring into play the principle that, generally, an 
insurer cannot exercise rights of subrogation to pursue a claim in the name of one co-assured 
against another? He referred to Rix LJ’s explanation of the basis of this principle in Tyco Fire 
& Integrated Solutions (UK) Ltd v Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd 52 , that the true basis of the 
contract between the parties needed to be construed. The contract’s terms may provide “a 
highly detailed and developed code which made it completely clear that they were designed to 
supplant any possible liability for negligence on the part of the contractor”53 or “the underlying 
contract envisages that one co-assured may be liable to another for negligence even within the 
sphere of the cover provided by the policy”. In the latter case Rix LJ was “inclined to think that 
there is nothing in the doctrine of subrogation to prevent the insurer suing in the name of the 
employer to recover the insurance proceeds which the insurer has paid in the absence of any 
express ouster of the right of subrogation . . .”54  
 
Looking at the contract in the instant case,  there was an express safe port warranty by 
the demise charterers, there was no code of rights and obligations in clause 12 with regard to 
insured losses caused by a breach of the safe port warranty and there was no express ouster of 
the right of subrogation in clause 12. These features all pointed to an intention that the demise 
charterer would be liable to the owner for breach of the safe port warranty, notwithstanding 
that they were joint assured and could take the benefit of the insurance in the manner set out in 
clause 12. There would be no double recovery by the owner because their recovery from the 
charterers would go to the insurers by way of subrogation. The decision has since been 
overruled by the Court of Appeal who held that the port was not unsafe and then went on to 
express the view that clause 12 did constitute a complete code for the treatment of insured 
losses as between the parties in the event of a total loss. 55 The parties intended there to be an 
insurance funded result in the event of loss or damage to the vessel by marine risks (and war 
risks) so that even if the charterers had been in breach of their safe port obligation the owners, 
and their subrogated insurers, would not have been able to recover from them. 
 
e) Indemnity 
 
Clause 17 provides a scheme of mutual indemnity whereby charterers are to indemnify the 
Owners against “any loss, damage or expense incurred by the Owners arising out of or in 
relation to the operation of the Vessel by the charterers, and against any lien of whatsoever 
nature arising out of any event occurring during the Charter Period.” In the event of arrest or 
detention by reason of claims or liens arising out of the vessels operations, the Charterers at 
their own expense “take all reasonable steps to secure that within a reasonable time the Vessel 
is released, including the provision of bail.” Without prejudice to the general indemnity 
charterers are to indemnify against all consequences or liabilities arising from the Master, 
                                                 
51  [198]. 
52   [2008] Lloyd's Rep IR 617; [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 584. 
53   [36]. 
54  [77]. 
55 [2015] EWCA Civ 16. 22 January 2015. 
officers or agents signing Bills of Lading or other documents.56 The indemnity does not cover 
liabilities arising out of negligence in the operation of the vessel or by reason of its 
unseaworthiness, and the clause should be amended to make specific reason to loss or damage 
arising thereby. As a co-assured, the owners will be liable for unpaid calls under the P&I cover 
and it would be prudent to make specific provision for this in the indemnity provisions. The 
indemnity should also extend to any fines incurred by the owners due to charterers’ operation 
of the vessel. The principle of ex turpi causa non actio oritur would generally render 
unenforceable a provision to be indemnified in respect of a fine. However, an indemnity against 
a strict liability fine where there is no element of fault on the part of the party subject to the 
fine, has been held to be enforceable.57 
 
If the vessel is arrested or detained by claims against owners, the owners, at their own 
expense, shall “take all reasonable steps to secure that within a reasonable time the Vessel is 
released, including the provision of bail” and to indemnify the Charterers against “any loss, 
damage or expense incurred by the Charterers (including hire paid under this Charter) as a 
direct consequence of such arrest or detention.” 
 
Clause 20 provides for a further indemnity in relation to wreck removal, as follows: “In 
the event of the Vessel becoming a wreck or obstruction to navigation the Charterers shall 
indemnify the Owners against any sums whatsoever which the Owners shall become liable to 
pay and shall pay in consequence of the Vessel becoming a wreck or obstruction to navigation.” 
The indemnity will not arise until the Owners have become liable to pay a sum and have paid 
a sum in consequence of the vessel becoming a wreck or obstruction to navigation. This will 
be after the charter has come to an end. In consequence, the owners will not be able to secure 
their claim by arresting a sister-ship of the charterers under s.21(4)(ii) of the Senior Courts Act 
1981.58 
 
 
f) Non-lien 
 
Clause 16 is an attempt to prevent maritime liens from arising by giving notice to parties 
dealing with charterers, such as suppliers, that charterers have no authority to create a maritime 
lien on the vessel in respect of claims by such parties against the charterers. It provides: 
“The Charterers will not suffer, nor permit to be continued, any lien or encumbrance 
incurred by them or their agents, which might have priority over the title and interest of 
the Owners in the Vessel. The Charterers further agree to fasten to the Vessel in a 
conspicuous place and to keep so fastened during the Charter Period a notice reading 
as follows: “This Vessel is the property of (name of Owners). It is under charter to 
(name of Charterers) and by the terms of the Charter Party neither the Charterers nor 
the Master have any right, power or authority to create, incur or permit to be imposed 
on the Vessel any lien whatsoever.” 
 
III. OWNERS’ REMEDIES FOR CHARTERERS’ DEFAULT 
 
                                                 
56  Claims under the indemnity would be made where the owners became liable under bills of lading 
signed by the master in jurisdictions in which such bills were regarded as evidencing a contract with the 
registered owner, notwithstanding that the master was the servant of the demise charterer. 
57  Osman v J Ralph Moss Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 313 (CA); more recently, Griffin v UHY Hacker 
Young & Partners (A Firm) [2010] EWHC 146 (Ch); [2010] P.N.L.R. 20. 
58  The Faial [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 473. 
In the event of default by charterers, the owners will want to get their vessel back. This will 
require termination of the charter and then repossession of the vessel. Clause 11 provides that 
hire is to be paid punctually in accordance and time shall be of the essence. Hire is to be paid 
continuously throughout the charter period and there is no provision for off-hire. 
 
A) Clause 28 – Termination-  
 
This provides for withdrawal of the vessel in the event of:  
(i) charterer’s failure to pay hire in accordance with cl. 11, subject to an anti-technicality 
provision whereby owners are to give charterers a set number of clear banking days 
within which to rectify the failure, where the failure is due to oversight, negligence, 
errors or omissions on the part of the Charterers or their bankers 
 (ii) the Charterers failure to comply with the requirements of: 
(1) Clause 6 (Trading Restrictions) 
(2) Clause 13(a) (Insurance and Repairs) 
Under this sub-clause the Owners “shall have the option, by written notice to the 
Charterers, to give the Charterers a specified number of days grace within which to 
rectify the failure without prejudice to the Owners' right to withdraw and terminate 
under this Clause if the Charterers fail to comply with such notice;” 
(iii) the Charterers fail to rectify any failure to comply  with the requirements of sub-
clause 10(a)(i) (Maintenance and Repairs) as soon as practically possible after the 
Owners have requested them in writing so to do and in any event so that the Vessel's 
insurance cover is not prejudiced.59 
The clause also provides for the charter to be deemed to be terminated if the Vessel becomes a 
total loss or is declared as a constructive or compromised or arranged total loss.  
Both charterers and owners are entitled to terminate this Charter with immediate effect 
by written notice to the other party “in the event of an order being made or resolution passed 
for the winding up, dissolution, liquidation or bankruptcy of the other party (otherwise than for 
the purpose of reconstruction or amalgamation) or if a receiver is appointed, or if it suspends 
payment, ceases to carry on business or makes any special arrangement of composition with 
its creditors.” 
The clause concludes by providing that “The termination of this Charter shall be 
without prejudice to all rights accrued due between the parties prior to the date of termination 
and to any claim that either party might have.” The obligation to pay hire will be a condition 
as time is expressed to be of the essence.60 Should the charter be terminated on this ground the 
                                                 
59   The clause also provides for  termination due to owners’ default, as follows:  
 “If the Owners shall by any act or omission be in breach of their obligations under this Charter to the 
extent that the Charterers are deprived of the use of the Vessel and such breach continues for a period of 
fourteen (14) running days after written notice thereof has been given by the Charterers to the Owners, the 
Charterers shall be entitled to terminate this Charter with immediate effect by written notice to the Owners.” 
60  See Parbulk II A/S v. Heritage Maritime Ltd SA (The “Mahakam”)  [2011] EWHC 2917 (Comm) 
[31];[2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87. 
owners will be entitled by way of damages to the outstanding instalments discounted for early 
payment.61 However, the other clauses which will trigger a right to terminate are not expressed 
to be conditions but, rather are innominate terms, and a termination on these grounds will not 
entitle the owners to damages for future sums. For this reason, it is common to include a term 
providing for a termination fee to be paid in the event of any termination. As a liquidated 
damages provision the sum stipulated will become payable without any enquiry into the nature 
of the losses sustained by the owners or without reference to the duty to mitigate. However, the 
clause must provide for a genuine pre-estimate of loss in the event of default, otherwise it will 
be classed as a penalty and will be unenforceable.  
 
The classification of a termination clause in a demise charter used as a finance lease 
was recently considered by the tribunal in London Arbitration 14/13.62 The charterers and their 
guarantors argue that the Termination Sums were penalties because they were “extortionate 
and extravagant in amount” and were not a genuine pre-estimate of any loss suffered by owners, 
relying partly on the fact that the Termination Sum was always 5 per cent greater than the 
Option Price by which the charterers could purchase the vessel before the end of the charter. 
The owners submitted that the law of penalties only applied where the relevant sums were 
payable upon a breach of contract and the termination clause provided for payment after any 
termination event which included a series of events unrelated to any breach by charterers. The 
tribunal rejected this argument because the owner had terminated because of the charterer’s 
failure to pay hire, which was a breach of contract. The charterers bore the burden of showing 
that the Termination Sums were unlawful penalties63 and the modern cases suggested that the 
court or tribunal was to ask whether there was a “commercial justification” for the clause in 
question.64 Recent cases such as Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong 65 
indicated that the courts should be slow to strike down clauses as penal, especially in 
commercial contracts between parties of equal bargaining power.  
 
The tribunal considered what the owners would have been entitled to by way of 
damages for breach of the obligation to pay hire on time under which time was expressed to be 
of the essence. Damages would be equal to the unpaid and remaining future hire payments 
under the charters plus the Option Price which the charterers would have been required to pay. 
To account for accelerated receipt, those future payments would need to be discounted to 
present value. This gave a figure of US$31,875,356. In comparison, the total of the Termination 
Sums payable as at the Termination Date was US$24,681,963.10. In the circumstances, the 
tribunal would accept the owners’ submission that the Termination Sums were “commercially 
justified” and were not intended to be a deterrent to the charterers from breaching the charters.  
The termination provisions in the charters were negotiated by two commercially sophisticated 
parties of equal bargaining power. Although, on any given date the Termination Sum would 
generally be 5 per cent higher than the Option Price, such a margin, where the termination of 
the charter was the result of a default in payment by the charterers (or other circumstances 
evidencing the weakening of the credit underlying the transaction) was “commercially 
                                                 
61  This is assumed to be the measure of damages for a termination of a bareboat charter for breach of 
condition, London Arbitration 14/13. However, the measure of damages for termination of a time charter for 
breach of condition is the difference between the charter hire rate and that obtained under a substitute charter for 
the unexpired period of the charter. The Astra [2013] EWHC 865 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 69. 
 
62  (2013) 880 LMLN 3. 
63  Murray v Leisureplay [2005] EWCA Civ 963; [2005] I.R.L.R. 946. 
64   See Lordsvale Finance plc v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752; Murray v Leisureplay above; and Alfred 
McAlpine Capital Projects Ltd v Tilebox Ltd [2005] EWHC 281 (TCC); [2005] B.L.R. 271. 
65  (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
justified” and consistent with market practice for such transactions. The Termination Sum was 
not intended as a “deterrent”, but was a reasonable, if necessarily unscientific, pre-estimate of 
the internal and other costs which might be incurred by the owners in such a default situation 
and which were not otherwise recoverable under the charters. 
In the event of default charterers may be able to obtain relief from forfeiture by applying 
to the court and tendering the outstanding sums owing to owners. In The Jotunheim66 Cooke J 
held that relief from forfeiture was available when an owner exercised a right of withdrawal 
under a demise charter. In Shiloh Spinners Limited v. Harding 67 Lord Wilberforce identified 
two well-recognised heads of the jurisdiction. The first was “where it is possible to state that 
the object of the transaction and of the insertion of the right to forfeit is essentially to secure 
the payment of money.” The second was the case of fraud, accident, mistake or surprise. In On 
Demand Plc v. Gerson Plc 68 Walker LJ identified a third head of jurisdiction arising out of 
Lord Wilberforce’s judgment, where the forfeiture provision is security for the production of a 
stated result which can effectively be attained on the hearing of an application for relief.  
Applying these principles, Cooke J concluded that the withdrawal clause was either within the 
first or the third of these categories and that the court did have jurisdiction to give relief from 
forfeiture.  
In exercising its discretion the court would look at the conduct of the party seeking 
relief from forfeiture, in particular whether his default was wilful, of the gravity of the breaches, 
and of the disparity between the value of the property in respect of which forfeiture is claimed 
as compared with the damage caused by the breach. In the present case the demise charterers’ 
case was not meritorious in that they had deliberately flouted their obligation to pay hire on 
time over three months despite owners’ constant protests. The court also had to consider the 
gravity of the breach as compared with the disparity between the value of the property of which 
forfeiture is claimed and the damage caused by the breach. The demise charterers had paid 
three months hire and a $25,000 deposit in order to earn the freight under contracts under 33 
bills of lading, which they had apparently received, as well as incurring some £12,000 
expenditure on the ship at the loading port. This was not a case where they had paid the majority 
of the hire or price for the vessel since the transaction is still at a very early stage. What they 
would lose, however, was the right to pay further hire over 45 months and to pay further 
deposits of $200,000 in order to purchase the ship at the end of that period and they would also 
lose the use of the ship as a profit-earning chattel for the duration of that period. In addition, 
sums already expended would be wasted and potential liabilities have been incurred, either 
under the bills of lading or under the sub-charter-party or both. Taking all these factors into 
account, and in particular the attitude of the charterers towards their payment obligations, 
Cooke J declined to give relief from forfeiture. 
Clause 29 deals with repossession following termination. Termination under cl.28 gives 
owners the right to repossess the Vessel from the Charterers at her current or next port of call, 
or at a port or place convenient to them without hindrance or interference by the Charterers, 
courts or local authorities.69 Pending physical repossession the charterers hold the vessel as 
                                                 
66 [2004] EWHC 671 (Comm); [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 181. In The Scaptrade [1988] 2 Lloyd's Reports 253 
the House of Lords had held that relief from forfeiture was not available where an owner exercised a right of 
withdrawal under a time charter, but had left open the position so far as demise charters was concerned. 
67  [1973] A.C. 691. 
68  [2000] 4 All E.R. 734. 
69  The clause continues; 
 
gratuitous bailee of the owners. This provision means that charterer’s legal possession of the 
vessel ceases on termination of the charter and any claims against charterers that arise out of 
the operation of the vessel between termination and physical redelivery will fall outside the 
provisions of s.20(4) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. However, owners need to take all possible 
steps to recover physical possession of the vessel after termination if they are not to risk being 
liable on contracts made by the charterers in this interim period by way of ostensible authority. 
 
Following repossession the lender will then seek to recover the sums outstanding under 
the sale contract by sale of the vessel, proceedings under guarantees, and attachment of the 
borrower’s assets. If the borrower owns other ships the lender may then consider an arrest. The 
fact that the demise charter is in fact a contract of sale by instalments will probably prevent an 
arrest of a sister ship of the demise charterer. The issue has recently arisen in the US in The 
Icon Amazing 70 where the owner was unable to attach a sister ship of the demise charterer 
under supplemental rule B of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.)’s Supplemental 
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims (hereinafter “the Supplemental Rules”) 
govern the procedure for arresting or attaching a vessel in the United States. Rule B allows a 
party to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant’s  property for any debt arising out 
of a maritime claim, when the defendant “cannot be found within the district.” The Texas court 
held that the owner’s claim was not a maritime claim.71 The charter required the charterer to 
purchase the vessel at the end of the term, the charter hire payments were not market-based but 
rather instalments of the full purchase price for the Vessel, and the claim was not only for 
unpaid charter hire, but also for additional security in the event of a depreciation in the value 
of the vessels under a loan to value clause. Taking these factors into account, the court held 
that this was not a "conventional maritime charter party" but, rather, an "inseparable component 
of a larger non-maritime vessel sale/financing transaction." In particular the claim for nearly 
$3,000,000 under the loan to value clause distinguished the case from a previous decision in 
Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy,72 in which the charter party was found to be severable from 
the sale agreement as the plaintiff had amended its complaint to eliminate claims related to the 
purchase price and only requested damages specifically related to the “lease.”  In this respect 
it is worth noting that from March 2013 it has become possible for finance charters over vessels 
registered in the Marshall Islands to be registered as a preferrred mortgage.73 This would give 
the owner an independent ground of access to the US District Courts for claims against the 
demise charterer. 
 
B) Insolvency.  
 
a) UK law 
 
                                                 
 The Owners shall arrange for an authorised representative to board the Vessel as soon as reasonably 
practicable following the termination of the Charter. The Vessel shall be deemed to be repossessed by 
the Owners from the Charterers upon the boarding of the Vessel by the Owners' representative. All 
arrangements and expenses relating to the settling of wages, disembarkation and repatriation of the 
Charterers; Master, officers and crew shall be the sole responsibility of the Charterers. 
 
 
70  951 F.Supp.2d 909 (2013 S.D.Texas) 
71   The general rule is that contracts for the sale of vessels are not maritime claims: The Ada, 250 F. 194 
(2d Cir.1918). 
72   428 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir.1970) 
73  The Maritime (Amendment) Act (No.1), 2013 which amended certain portions of the Marshall Islands 
Maritime Act, 1990. 
The compulsory or voluntary winding-up of a bareboat charterer will not normally prohibit or 
otherwise prevent the finance lessor/owner from exercising its right to repossess its own 
property (i.e. the ship) then in the hands of the company74, and this is also the case when the 
charterers are in administrative receivership.75 It is unlikely that the conditional sale contained 
in the bareboat charter will be recharacterised as a security interest.76 The provisions of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002) relating to administration covers 
all hire purchase agreements and chattel-leasing agreements such as bareboat charters. 
Paragraph 111 of Schedule B1 defines ‘“hire-purchase agreement” as including a conditional 
sale agreement, a chattel leasing agreement77 and a retention of title agreement’. Under s.43(3) 
of Schedule B the owners will need the consent of the administrator or the court to take 
possession of the vessel. If the hire remaining to be paid under the bareboat charter is 
considerably less than the current market value of the ship and the bareboat charterers are ready, 
willing and able to carry on paying the charter hire it is possible that the court will prevent the 
finance lessor/owner from exercising its right to recover possession of the ship78 and permit 
the bareboat charterers to carry on performing their obligations under the charter, so as to 
preserve their existing rights under the charter.   
 
Under paragraph 72(1) of Schedule B an administrator has the power, exercisable with 
the court's agreement, to dispose of goods (including a ship) in the possession of the company 
in administration under a chattel-leasing agreement (such as a bareboat charter) “as if all the 
rights of the owner under the [chattel leasing] agreement were vested in the company”. The 
court is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that this provision is only invoked in 
promoting one or more of the purposes for which the administration order was made. The 
disposal proceeds must also be used to pay down or discharge all amounts outstanding under 
the charter. This could mean that the administrator is not liable to account for the full value of 
the ship if (as is likely) it exceeds the amounts due under the charter (unless an order to account 
for the full value is obtained from the court). 
 
Under para 13 of Schedule 1 of the 1986 Act an administrator is given “Power to make 
any payment which is necessary or incidental to the performance of his functions.” This would 
enable it to pay charter hire and to grant leave to the finance lessor/owner to take possession of 
the ship. The discretion must be exercised as quickly as possible 79 and where a ship is retained 
without the full hire (or any hire) being paid, the administrator is obliged to give precise reasons 
for the exercise of his discretion in such a manner.80  
 
There is little English law authority as to whether a clause in a financing bareboat 
charter which purports automatically to terminate the charter on presentation of a petition for 
                                                 
74  General Share & Trust Co v. Wetley Brick and Pottery Co (1882) Ch D 260 and Re Blue Jeans Sales 
Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 641. 
75  Since the introduction of the Enterprise Act 2002, the holder of a floating charge cannot appoint an 
administrative receiver unless that floating charge was created before 15 September 2003 or if a statutory 
exemption applies, none of which is likely to apply in the case of a bareboat charter.21  See sections 72A to 72G 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002), and Order 2003, SI 2003/2095, article 2. 
76   See, for example, Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd  [1992] BCC 270 (CA). 
77  Defined in s.251 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
78  Following the decision in Transag Haulage Ltd v. Leyland DAF Finance Ltd [1994] BCC 356. 
79  In order to avoid attracting other claims against him such as wrongful detention or interference with 
goods. See Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v. Sibec Developments Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1253 (Ch D). 
This judgment considered the wording of s.11 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which has now been replaced by 
Schedule B1 which contains different wording. 
80  See Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] Ch. 505. Nicholls LJ sets out  guidelines for the exercise 
of an administrator's discretion at p.529. 
a winding-up or an administration order is effective.81 Davis82 suggests that the automatic 
termination should be expressed to be effective before presentation of the petition, since on 
presentation of the petition the automatic stay on rights comes into effect (including the right 
to take possession).83 
 
b) US Law 
 
Lease financing for ship finance is not in favour in the US due to the risk of a 
‘recharacterisation’ of the charter so that the ship is treated as the property of the demise 
charterer in the event of the charterer’s insolvency being determined before the US bankruptcy 
courts. Under U.S. law, an agreement in the form of a lease which vests most of the economic 
benefits in the lessee may be recharacterized by the courts, particularly in bankruptcy, as in 
reality a security agreement. If the courts determine that the named lessor does not truly retain 
the economic benefits of the property ownership, but rather appears to be a creditor secured by 
its possession of title to the assets, the nominal lessee may be deemed the owner of the asset.84 
It is possible that a security interest in the bareboat charterer’s rights to vessel earnings can be 
perfected by a UCC Financing Statement and perhaps an account control agreement (UCC §9-
102(a)(2)(vi)), but the security interest is of low value and will yield to maritime liens, tax liens 
and other tort liens in any vessel foreclosure. 
 
Until recently, no flag state legal system afforded a means for a ship lessor to perfect a 
security interest in vessels to which it held title.85 However, on March 6, 2013, the Marshall 
Islands became the first flag state to adopt such a system for lease finance of vessels. Nitijela 
Bill No. 25 amends and adds to the Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Act (the “Act”) 
to create new definitions for “documented owner,”86 “financing charter”87 and “finance 
charterer”.88  A new Section 302A of the Act allows either party to file a financing charter with 
the Marshall Islands registry. A properly-filed financing charter will enjoy the status of a 
preferred mortgage on the vessel in favour of the documented owner.  The new law provides 
that, even if the owner and charterer agree in the charter that the charter constitutes a “financing 
charter,” this declaration alone is not binding on third parties or courts hearing the question. 
Under the new law, the documented owner may itself grant conventional preferred mortgages 
on the vessel, subject to whatever restrictions may exist in prior agreements entered into by the 
documented owner. It should be possible to continue to argue that the charter is a true lease 
                                                 
81  But see Transag Haulage Ltd v. DAF Finance plc (cited above) where the court exercised its equitable 
jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture of a hire purchase agreement which had been terminated in 
accordance with a provision making it terminable upon the appointment of a receiver. 
82  M.Davis, Bareboat Charters (2nd ed 2005) Informa Law, 35-38. 
83  See Re David Meek Plant Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 680. 
84  . See In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. (U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, 
1996 AMC 1488 decided April 18, 1996), in which the court held that the economic structure of the 
arrangements was a financing transaction and not a lease and that consequently ownership remained in the 
bankrupt charterer and the lessors were held to be unsecured creditors. 
85  Unlike the position with commercial aircraft finance, in which lessors have long been able to record 
leases or memoranda of leases with governmental authorities for purposes of establishing the priority of rights in 
the aircraft. 
86  A “documented owner” is the person who appears in the application for documentation, even if he 
may hold only legal title and not the full benefits and indicia of ownership. 
87  A “financing charter” is “a demise or bareboat charter, regardless of duration, between the documented 
owner and the finance charterer, which is agreed by the parties to be or is determined in judicial or arbitral 
proceedings to create in favor of the documented owner a security interest in the vessel” in favor of the finance 
charterer. 
88  A “finance charterer” is the person identified as the charterer in the financing charter.  
but, in the alternative, if it is determined in any court or tribunal or by any governmental 
authority not to be a true lease, then the charter is agreed to be a financing charter entitled to 
the status of a preferred mortgage under Marshall Islands law. Enforcement of this new 
preferred mortgage outside the Marshall Islands will depend on the jurisdiction of arrest. Under 
US law foreign mortgages are enforceable provided they meet certain minimum requirements 
of central filing and availability for inspection.  
